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LEGAL MEMORANDA

ARGENTINA
The following is a review of legal and economic developments
in Argentina.
I.

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS

A New PrivatizationLaw-Debt-to-Equity Conversion
Possible
In today's world, the large state-owned sector of the Argentine
economy has clearly become expensive and inefficient. The biggest
loser in the economic scheme is the consumer, who deals not only
with poor services, but also with high costs, primitive equipment,
and corruption. Recognizing this imbalance, the recently elected
administration sought to privatize the economy.
Under a privatization program, portions of the industrial sector controlled by the government are transferred to private control
and operation. Assuming that privatization efforts are successful,
less governmental interference in the economy should translate
into a government which merely regulates some of the industries,
rather than acting as it now does as a major producer; monitors the
performance of private parties in a variety of services presently
provided by financially bankrupt public agencies; and receives returns by way of royalties, rents or taxes.
Through privatization and deregulation, Argentina seeks to replace state-owned agencies with equivalent private sector enterprises. Currently, state-owned agencies operate with captive consumers and purchase services and equipment primarily from
favored state-owned suppliers. In order to break from this inefficiency, a host of new private companies is expected to assume the
challenge of privatizing the Argentine economy.
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To achieve privatization, Law 23.696 authorizes the Executive
Branch to: 1) replace the board of directors or administrators of
companies and agencies presently owned by the federal government with intervenors, appointed by the Executive to assist in the
privatization process, who will supervise the reorganization of the
respective company or agency to which the intervenor is appointed; 2) transform, when necessary, state-owned enterprises
into corporations or other vehicles which allow private participation; and 3) merge, spinoff, transform or reorganize the respective
company or agency as necessary.
In order to be privatized, a company or agency must first be
formally declared "subject to privatization" under Law No. 23.696.
The executive branch must make this declaration with the approval of Congress. This declaration, however, is not required
where the state already has a "controlling stock participation." In
such cases, the law authorizes the executive branch to sell the
stock participation of the company without any further approval
or consent.
Law 23.696 also contains an exhibit listing all companies or
agencies whose privatization (total or partial) have been ex ante
decided or authorized. The companies and agencies to be totally or
partially privatized include:
1) Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL);
2) Optar, an Aerolineas Argentinas captive domestic wholesale
travel agency;
3) Aerolineas Argentinas (a partial privatization of this Argentine national airline is sought);
4) Buenos Aires Catering, a catering joint-venture between
Aerolineas Argentinas and Swissair;
5) Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas (ELMA), the stateowned shipping company;
6) Yacimientos Carboniferos Fiscales, a coal producer with a
marginal mine (Rio Turbio) located in Patagonia;
7) Conarsur, a consulting company;
8) Direcci6n Nacional de Vialidad (it is envisioned that the
government will contract out to private companies road repair,
maintenance, and some infrastructure construction work);
9) Ferrocarriles Argentinos (the government will contract out
to private parties all railway cargo services, maintenance, and re-
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pair work, as well as some infrastructure development work);
10) Empresa Nacional de Correos y Tel~grafos (the Post Office
will deregulate this sector and contract out services);
11) Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) (the activities of
the state-owned oil and gas agency will be privatized by continuing
the practice of entering into service and joint-venture agreements
with private companies for the exploration and exploitation of oil
and gas fields; concessions and secondary or tertiary recovery contracts are also foreseen as a means to privatize YPF's activities);
12) L.S.84 TV Channel 11 and L.S.85 TV Channel 13 (although these television stations will be sold, the State, nevertheless, will keep one television station, L.S.82 TV Channel 7 in which
foreign participation will not be allowed);
13) L.R.3 Radio Belgrano and L.R.5 Radio Excelsor (the State
will retain ownership and foreign participation will be allowed in
LRA.1 Radio Nacional, Radio Difusi6n al Exterior (RAE), and the
national radio network);
14) Subterrdneos de Buenos Aires, the Federal District subway
agency;
15) Coordinaci6n Ecol6gica Area Metropolitana Sociedad del
Estado, a company jointly owned by the City of Buenos Aires and
the Province of Buenos Aires, which is a large urban landowner, in
charge of contracting refuse collection services and landfill
operations;
16) Casa de Piedra, electricity supply;
17) All of the City of Buenos Aires' recreational, cultural, and
maintenance services;
18) Junta Nacional de Granos (the sale of different grain storage facilities is envisioned);
19) Administraci6n Nacional de Puertos (port authorities will
either be privatized or transferred to the province where they are
geographically located);
20) Casa de la Moneda (the government will contract out to
private companies the printing of currency, public bonds, and
securities);
21) Talleres Navales Ddrsena Norte (TANDANOR),
yard located in the Port of Buenos Aires; and

a ship-

22) Compafiia Azucarera Las Palmas S.A., a sugar mill.
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Agencies to be transferred to provincial or municipal jurisdiction through ad hoc agreements are:
1) Obras Sanitarias de la Naci6n, which is responsible for
water supply and sewage services;
2) Direcci6n Nacional de Vialidad, which is responsible for
road construction and maintenance services; and
3) Gas del Estado (the government will transfer to local agencies the distribution of natural gas).
Agencies to be completely reorganized through eventual
merger are:
1) Water supply and sewage services in and around the City
of Buenos Aires, inside and outside of the Federal District;
2) Exploration, production, distribution, and supply of oil,
gas, and coal; and
3) Generation, distribution, and supply of electricity (the
merged agencies will contract out most distribution activities to
private parties and priority will be given, where feasible, to
cooperatives).
A large across-the-board privatization effort is expected. When
privatization is completed, it will change the economic profile of
Argentina, where the State has retained a frustrating and dominating stronghold for so long.
In the process of privatizing a company or agency, the executive branch also has the power to deregulate the sector or activity.
By eliminating or dismantling privileges, restrictions or monopolies
which could frustrate privatization efforts or result in the replacement of a State monopoly with a private monopoly, success of the
program could be virtually guaranteed. Undoubtedly, sweeping reforms will be necessary in several sectors.
If the privatization of an agency is not possible, the executive
branch is specifically authorized to liquidate the agency. Termination may be the only possible alternative when dealing with companies or agencies which, at present, are economically unfeasible.
Under Law No. 23.696, an individual decree is to govern the
privatization process of each company or agency. This individual
decree will set and define the procedures, mechanisms, and conditions to which the respective privatization will be subject. Nevertheless, Congress will monitor all privatization efforts through a
special Committee composed of six members of the Senate and six

1989]

ARGENTINA

members of the Chamber of Deputies.
Moreover, Law 23.696 allows for different privatization procedures and alternatives, such as sales of assets or stock, transformation, formation or spinoffs of companies, mergers, liquidations,
permits, licenses, and concessions for the exploitation of public services. Debt-to-equity conversions are also specifically permitted. As
a formal component of the Brady Plan, debt-to-equity conversions
are particularly attractive because they have no detrimental expansionary effect on the money supply.
The law also contemplates the possibility of privatizing companies or agencies where the State assumes all or part of the companies' individual indebtedness or liabilities. Without this alternative, the privatization of companies or agencies with a large foreign
debt will not be feasible.
The government may give total or partial preferences to parties presently having a partial ownership of the entity being privatized. Still, employers, suppliers, and/or customers can be included
in a program (Programade PropiedadParticipada)through which
they may obtain soft financing.
As a rule, the government will privatize through public calls
for bids, public auctions or sales made at the stock exchanges.
Nevertheless, on a smaller scale, the government can enter into direct contracts with employees, suppliers or customers. When
awarding contracts, the executive branch must take into account
the highest offered price or bid, but also any other possible benefits to public or common interests.
Public agencies must always appraise the value of the companies or assets to be sold. However, when the public agencies lack
the capacity to do the respective appraisal, international agencies
or other foreign or domestic private parties will conduct the
appraisals.
Prior to executing any contract under the privatization procedures, the Tribunal de Cuentas de la Naci6n and/or the Sindicatura General de Empresas Pdblicas must give its opinion. These
control and supervision agencies must either object to the execution of the contract or suggest changes to the contract within ten
days after being contacted. Otherwise, the transaction may go forward as negotiated.
Law 23.696 also contains provisions which regulate the current
"administrative emergency" in Argentina. During such an emer-
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gency, the government must follow special contractual procedures
defined in this law. Law 23.696 established special ad hoc contractual termination mechanisms and rules governing a suspension of
enforcement of all judgments against the State. Using these rules,
the administration seeks to reorganize its chaotic situation while
simultaneously allowing the privatization drive to progress and
thereby slowly erode the main cause of the State's economic
problems and failures, namely, its overwhelming role of inefficient
provider of everything. The challenge is difficult considering the
role of the State as employer, employing one out of every four Argentine workers.
Following the enactment of Law 23.969, the Executive Branch
issued the first decree laying down individual rules for the privatization of Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL).
ENTEL, like most Argentine state-owned service companies, is
malfunctioning. It is an inefficient and corrupt communications
monopoly.
The government was to offer the whole Argentine territory, divided in three regions to private companies, both foreign and local,
through a call for bids. The government entrusted the Ministry of
Public Works with the duty of preparing the first draft of the corresponding bidding conditions. The executive branch was to review
bids. In turn, the executive branch was to determine whether ENTEL will be released from its present indebtedness in order to
make privatization opportunities more attractive. Further, the executive branch was to grant its final approval to the bidding conditions by December 31, 1989. Due to the complexities involved,
however, the government railway agency, Ferrocarriles Argentinos,
has replaced ENTEL as the lead candidate for privatization. The
Federal Government expects to award the respective licenses to
private parties prior to June 28, 1990. Licensees will have to organize themselves as ad hoc corporations. In each case, the operator is
to hold not less than fifty-one percent of its capital and votes. The
decree further foresees a participation by the licensees' employees
of up to ten percent.
In exchange for minimum service and technological commitments, licensees will operate for an initial five-year term, during
which they will enjoy substantial exclusivity in their respective areas. This exclusivity, however, will cover only basic services. For
example, data processing, information, and mobile telecommunications will be open to third party competition right from the begin-
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ning of the license. After this initial period, the government will
fully deregulate the areas and open the areas to competition from
service providers.
Should the privatization process maintain reasonable strength
and momentum, it will be able to overcome expected trade union
resistance and contribute to a gradual reduction in the public sector deficit. This reduction of the deficit is a signal required to
avoid pessimism which continues to erode Argentina's confidence
in its economy. Although the process is risky and strenuous, it remains a time for change and opportunity.
U.S. Investments Insurance GuarantyProgram Expanded
Over the years, the United States government has insured,
under the Investment Guaranty Program (the "Program"), funds
invested abroad by American citizens or corporations. Since 1971
when it began its operations, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), has managed the Program. The Program began
in 1948 in response to the role private investors played in the reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan. In the 1950s, its
focus switched toward the developing world.
The insurance scheme requires the negotiation of a bilateral
treaty with each individual host country where insurance is to be
provided, thus spelling out on a case by case basis procedures to be
followed. In this manner, the United States government reduces its
own risk by obtaining, in advance, clear procedures to be followed
in the event that a claim should be honored. Through the Program,
U.S. investors can obtain coverage against varying political risks,
such as convertibility, expropriation, war, revolution, and insurrection. OPIC also provides financing through direct loans or guarantees under certain conditions to investments that could be made in
cash, technology or equipment.
On December 22, 1959, Argentina and the United States entered into a bilateral treaty. As required by Argentine law, the Argentine Congress subsequently ratified the treaty through Law
15.803 enacted on May 5, 1961. The law only provided for the socalled convertibility guarantee. Under the convertibility guarantee,
if an investor was prevented from transferring profits, earnings or
capital into U.S. dollars for a certain period of time, the investor
could obtain the corresponding dollar payment from the United
States Government. Inconvertibility coverage also protects inves-
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tors against the possibility of adverse discriminatory exchange
rates. This coverage does not, however, protect against devaluation
of the host country's currency. In return for this guarantee, the
Argentine Government agreed to transfer the respective dollars,
when available, to the United States Government and acknowledge
the subrogation by the United States Government of all rights the
investor may have had. The Argentine Government later extended
coverage to include expropriation risks, and the risk of war, revolution, insurrection, and civil strife. On June 5, 1963, the Argentine
Government executed a special protocol (Protocolo Adicional) for
such a purpose.
The treaty remained operative until 1971 when the treaty became inactive due to the then prevailing local political conditions.
With the gradual changes introduced by the present Argentine
Government aimed at economic development, the treaty was reactivated in 1986. Since the reactivation, OPIC has granted financing
to five Argentine projects. An additional ten projects are under
consideration. OPIC also has an "Opportunity Bank" in Washington, D.C., which provides information linking potential U.S. investors with entrepreneurs that help set up new projects in developing
countries.
The Argentine Government recently expanded the Program
through Decree 618/89, dated May 23, 1989. The Decree provides,
among other things:
1) The Argentine Government must grant approvals by the
method established by the Decree. Under the bilateral treaty, only
those projects expressly approved by the Argentine Government
are provided coverage;
2) The Ministry of Economy issues approvals requested in
connection with projects falling under the scope of the Foreign Investment Law. If foreign investments do not require an ex ante
approval by the Foreign Investment authority (Law 21.382, Articles 4 and 6), the Ministry must issue the guaranty approval not
later than thirty days from the filing of the corresponding request;
and
3) The Argentine Government may now issue approvals to
projects having an Argentine risk, but which, nevertheless, do not
contain an investment component. In these particular cases, requests must be filed with the Legal and Technical Secretary of the
Presidency of the Republic. The Secretary, after reviewing the re-
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quest, must recommend either its approval or its rejection. Approvals, when granted, require the National Executive Power to issue a decree. Such approvals must be registered in a special
Registry created by Decree 618/89.
It is to be hoped the new regulation will simplify proceedings
and foster U.S. investments in Argentina. The amount of U.S. investments recorded in 1988 reflects increased desire to invest by
investors who have taken advantage of OPIC insurance: US$536
million in twelve projects, ranging in size from US$250,000 for a
smaller commercial operation to US$245 million for a large petrochemical venture by Dow Chemical. There are currently twenty
projects under consideration, representing an investment of the
United States of approximately US$400 million.
Also under the Decree, the Argentine Government may now
review a wide variety of new forms of international agreements. If
the agreements are approved, the government may include the
agreements in the traditional investment insurance program.
These agreements include: license agreements, leasing, franchising,
management contracts, turn-key projects, production-sharing arrangements, and service contracts.

II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Judicial Collection of a Check Drawn on a Foreign BankNotice of Dishonor
In Rhodia Argentina S.A. v. Polisecki, an Argentine corporation sued an Argentine resident in an Argentine Commercial Court
to collect on a check drawn by the defendant on a New York bank.
The New York bank refused to pay the check upon presentment because there were no funds available in defendant's account. The bank stated, in writing on the instrument, that payment had been refused for lack of funds. Although under New
York law, the bank's actions would serve as full proof of dishonor,
without the requisite of formal protest, the issue was whether the
writing constituted a formal protest under Argentine law.
In proceedings below, the trial judge refused to enforce plaintiff's claim on the ground that the plaintiff did not make a formal
protest of the check, a procedural enforcement prerequisite under
Argentine law.
The National Commercial Court of Appeals reversed the lower
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court and allowed the plaintiff's right to enforce the check. Thus,
the Court held that enforcement of a check must take into account
the laws of the domicile of the bank against which it is drawn. The
Court found in this case that the laws of the State of New York
governed the notice of dishonor. The Court further maintained
that the Argentine Court could apply foreign law ex officio, even
when the parties have not requested or proved its applicability. As
a result, the Court applied Sections 3-301, 3-508(5), and 3-510(8)
of the Uniform Commercial Code, as applicable in the State of
New York, to this case and recognized the New York bank's writings as full proof of dishonor.
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